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ABSTRACT 
Confidential Revenue and Profit Forecasts by Management and Financial 
Analysts; Evidence from The Netherlands 
Interest in corporate forecasts has increased significantly in the last 
decade. A major reason for the current interest is the shift in policy 
of several rule-making bodies toward benign acceptance or even the re- < 
quirement of forecast disclosures, as in the case of UK take-over pros-
pectuses. Research has focused on the accuracy of published management 
forecasts of profit, often taking the accuracy of published analysts' 
forecasts or forecasts generated from forecasting models as a Standard 
of comparison. 
The design of this study differs from previous research in that, among 
other things, (a) it is based on confidential instead of published data, 
(b) it includes revenue and profit data, and (c) it investigates the ex-
tent to which the forecasters themselves were surprised by the actual 
outcomes. Included in this study are 53 forecasts of a representative 
sample of companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and 124 fore-
casts provided by the members of the Dutch Financial Analysts Federation. 
The aim of our study was to examine the accuracy of these internal forecasts. 
The results for the management and analysts' groups are first presentéd 
separately, and then the comparative accuracy of these groups is analyzed. 
Management is shown to forecast revenues and profits slightly, but not 
significantly, better than do analysts. Both groups of forecasters were 
to a large extent surprised themselves by the actual 1980 revenues and 
profits. Thé paper concludes with a discussion of the results of this 
study, particularly as they relate to the accounting policy debate on 
disclosure of corporate forecasts. 
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Confidential Revenue and Profit Forecasts by Management and 
Financial Analysts; Evidence from The Netherlands 
Interest in corporate forecasts has increased significantly in the 
last decade. Researchers and practitioners alike have been concerned 
with such forecasts mainly in the context of a discussion of the 
merits of publishing this information either on a voluntary or on a 
mandatory basis. Most of the earlier research done in this field has , • 
focused on the accuracy of published profit forecasts (see, e.g. 
Abdel-khalik and Thompson [j-978] , Richards and Fraser Q978J and 
Westwick £l982j for reviews). Our study also concentraies on the 
accuracy of corporate forecasts, but it departs from previous research 
in several respects including (1) that we were able to use internal 
forecasts made confidentially available to us by corporate managements 
and financial analysts and (2) we obtained forecasts of revenue as well 
as profit. The aim of our study was to examine the accuracy of these 
internal forecasts. 
This paper is divided into four sections. In the first section we 
briefly discuss some earlier studies focusing on some of the problems 
that arise in interpreting their results. In section two we describe 
our research design, including the ways in which it differs from previous 
research and the contribution this study may therefore make. In 
section three our results for the corporate and analysts' forecasts 
are first treated individually, and -then the accuracy of the two groups 
is compared. The final section provides a discussion of the results of 
this study. 
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RELATED RESEARCH 
Nearly all studies in this field have dealt with the accuracy of 
published prbfit forecasts. The background of these studies was the 
debate on disclosure of corporate forecasts. Recognizing that only 
relatively accurate forecasts could be deemed relevant, most researchers 
tried to determine the level of accuracy of corporate forecasts 
actually published. Early research focused on this accuracy per se 
(Daily Q971J ; Westwick £1972] ; McDonald Q.973] ) . The difficulty with 
interpreting the results of these studies is that no Standard was 
provided against which the reported levels of accuracy can be evaluated. 
Therefore, subsequent research has endeavoured to incorporate such 
a Standard, by taking either forecasts published by financial analysts 
or those generated by forecasting models as a basis of comparison. The 
former can be seen as representing the forecasting abiliti;es of the 
most knowledgeable group of outsiders; the latter postulates the 
potential accuracy of forecasting methods available to any outsider. 
The typical study of the comparative accuracy of corporate and 
financial analysts' forecasts is based on corporate data obtained 
from the Wall Street Journal and analysts' data published in Standard 
and Poor's Earnvngs Foreaaster or the Value Line Investment Survey. 
The forecast errors are preferably compared on a matched-pairs sample 
basis. Such a research design was foliowed, for instance, by Basi, 
Carey and Twark £l976{ based on data published in 1970 and 1971. They 
1) We have used both types of standards, but, as space is limited, we 
shall only report on the comparisons with analysts' forecasts in 
this paper. Consequently, studies employing forecasting models as 
a Standard will not be included in our discussion in this section. 
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reported an absolute forecast error of 10.1 % for management and 
13.8 % for analysts. The difference is not statistically significant 
2) 
at the 5 %-level. This main finding was confirmed in a replication 
by Imhoff £l978| using data from 1971-1974. 
Both the above studies used analysts' forecasts produced before the 
publication of management forecasts. Ruland jj.978] and Jaggi p.98'Ój 
split their samples of analysts' forecasts into those published before 
the management forecast and those published after. Ruland iound no 
statistically significant difference between the accuracy of/management 
forecasts and both sets of analysts' forecasts. Jaggi reported that 
the analysts' forecasts announced prior to the management forecast 
release were significantly less accurate, which was not true of those 
announced after the management release. 
These results run counter to intuition. On the basis of the generally 
assumed importance of "inside information" and the (scarce) empirical 
evidence available (e.g. Jaffe £l974J) one would have expected management 
to consistently out-perform the analysts. However, in only one of the 
four studies mentioned above were the management forecasts which were 
issued after the analysts' forecasts significantly more accurate. This 
is all the more surprising if one takes into account the fact that these 
analysts were confronted with a longer forecasting horizon and possibly 
also with a knowledge handicap. The latter may be the case, for instance, 
if the corporate forecast is announced together with other significant 
information, such as interim results. 
2\ See Albrecht et dl. ^973 for a critique of the BCT-study and 
Basi et dl. JJ.977J for a reply. 
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There are, however, some problems involved in the interpretation of 
these results. One problem is that the forecasts cannot be assumed to 
be independent if they are both published. The finding that analysts' 
forecasts published after the corporate forecasts do not differ 
significantly from the latter may, of course, be explained by this 
dependency. But it is equally conceivable that corporate forecasts are 
influenced by the expectations which the financial community has made 
3) public beforehand. Another problem concerns the nature of a published 
forecast. Is this management's best estimate or does it reflect a 
bias - optimistic or pessimistic? Results of research conducted in 
the US support the former (af. Copeland and Marioni £l972|; McDonald 
["1973] ; Basi et al. £1976] ; Imhoff Ql978J ) , while the latter is 
generally argued in the UK where profit forecasts are usually derived 
from take-over prospectuses. In fact, a pessimistic bias has been 
established empirically by some researchers in the UK (see Dev and 
Webb £.1972f ; Westwick £l972] ; Ferris [l975, 1976] ) . Be that as it 
may, the general problem is whether management forecasting behavior 
is influenced to the point of bias by the prospect of publication of 
the forecasts. In addition, there may be a strong pressure on 
corporations to manage earnings in order to meet a published forecast 
(see Kearney Q.972, p. 54] and Ferris Jj-975]). A final problem is 
whether the companies publishing forecasts can be regarded as a 
representative sample of their populations. This problem is 
especially relevant if one wants to generalize the research results, 
say, to predict the effects of a general rule concerning publication 
of forecasts. Imhoff [_1978[ and Jaggi and Grier [_198Ö] have shown that 
3) Or, alternatively, that only companies which feel they can live 
up to these expectations publish a forecast. This may lead to non-
representati^eness of the samples, as discussed later. 
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firms which do disclose forecasts differ from those who do not 
particularly with regard to the variability in their historical 
earnings. Forecast-rdisclosing firms tend to have more stable earning 
properties. Therefore/ it is highly questionable whether one can 
generalize the results of studies based on-published forecasts 
to all firms that would be affected by a general rule on forecast 
disclosure. 
A final remark may be made on the research into the Information content 
of forecast disclosures. Such studies have been conducted by, for example, 
Foster £l973| ? Patell Q976I ; Nichols and Tsay £l979j and Penman 
£l98Öj . The results indicate that voluntary forecast disclosures do 
have information content as measured by the security price reactions. 
However, as most researchers note, it is not possible to separate the 
information content of the predicted earnings figure itself from the 
significance of the voluntary act of publishing such information, as 
perceived by the investors. Again, if the samples of forecast disclosing 
firms are non-representative, the investors might react to the self-
selection on the part of the firms implicit in the act of voluntary 
4). 
forecast disclosure. 
4) Investors might, for instance, believe that these firms look forward 
to higher earnings than the financial community generally expects 
and/or which are to be predicted from their historical earnings. 
These firms might be tempted to signal their higher expectations 
to the market (see, however, Jaggi and Grier Q.98ÖJ for empirical 
evidence). 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data collection 
Toward the end of 1979, we approached all 193 companies listed on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange with a request to Iparticipate in our study. 
All companies who did not demur to this request were subse-
quently sent a short questionnaire in the beginning of 1980. They were' 
requested to deposit this questionnaire, containing their internal 
sales revenue and profit forecasts for 1980, in a sealed envelope at 
a notarial office. In addition, we asked all 285 members of the Dutch 
Financial Analysts' Federation to deposit their forecasts of revenue 
and profit of the participating companies at the same office. The 
notary guaranteed to all respondents that the forecasts would be 
turned over to us only aftev the actual figures for 1980 were published. 
We guaranteed that it would not be possible to derive individual 
data on the companies or the analysts from the publications of our 
research. The companies were requested to deposit their forecasts 
befove the annual report on the previous year (1979) had been approved 
by the Board. In principle, therefore, these forecasts could have been 
included in the annual report. Accordingly, the analysts were asked to 
deposit their forecasts before the company-specific approval date of 
the annual report. 
All participants were asked to indicate their "best guess" point 
estimates of 1980 revenue and profit. They were specifically 
instructed to minimize the (expected) difference between their forecast 
and the actual outcome for 1980. In order to test the uncertainties 
involved in these forecasts, both management and the analysts were 
5) At that time we asked the companies to supply the approval 
date of the annual report to us. Thus, we could pass this date on 
to the analysts, as discussed later. 
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asked to indicate two ranges around their "best guess" point estimates 
of revenue and profit: 
1. A 50 %-confidence interval denoting the area in which they expected 
the outcome to be with 50 % certainty; and 
2. A 100 %-confidence interval indicating the range which they feit 
with complete certainty would contain the actual outcome. (Of course, 
they were asked to define this range within as narrow limits as 
possible.) 
We obtained the coöperation of 55 out of the 193 companies listed on 
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange at the end of 1979. Two companies, how-
ever, had to be excluded from our sample, as they went into bankruptcy 
before the end of 1980. Therefore, 53 management forecasts were ultimately 
included in our sample. This sample proved to be representative of the 
total population of listed companies with respect to (a) dual tests 
of the variability of revenue and profit, and (b) the absolute prediction 
errors resulting from the application of two revenue and profit fore-
casting models (see appendix A for further information on these tests). 
We received 124 analysts' forecasts from the notary. It is difficult 
to say how many individual analysts participated in our study, as the 
analysts' departments of some banks and institutional investors 
decided to participate as a group and to deposit their forecasts 
under one name. Therefore, all we can say is that the analysts' 
forecasts were prepared by at least 30 analysts working for 14 different 
organizations, such as banks, pension funds, Insurance companies, and 
brokers. The majority of our analyst participants - preparing 82 fore-
casts - work for six major Dutch banks. It is their task to give advice 
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on the investment decisions of private investors. As such, they can 
be considered the most important and best-informed alternative source 
of information for private investors apart from the company itself. 
Most of the other analysts work for major institutional investors. 
They are responsible.for the investment decisions of their institutions. 
Differences from previous research and their implications 
Our research design differs from previous studies in at least the 
following respects: 
1. We did not use published forecasts but asked management and 
analysts to make internal confidential forecasts known to us (or 
to produce such forecasts for this occasion). This may have some 
impact on the accuracy of the forecasts. Kearney £l972[ and Ferris 
£l975j have produced some empirical evidence that management fore-
casts may be. adapted if they are to be published or even that out-
comes may be to some ex'tent manipulated in order to meet forecasts 
previously published. Our confidential forecasts would not lead to 
such behavioral effects and might therefore be expected to be the 
best, i.e. least biased, forecasts that management and analysts 
could produce. In addition, our forecasts do not represent public 
information and are thus less likely tohave influenced other 
6) forecasts. A final difference one might hypothesize is that 
companies that would not voluntarily publish forecasts, regarding them 
as too inaccurate, might nevertheless be willing to participate in 
our research since they would perceive no unfavorable effects in 
doing so. 
6) We have tested the effect of eliminating the forecasts which could 
have been based on contacts between management and analysts. See 
our comparative results for the outcome of this test. 
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2. Our research covered both revenue and profit forecasts of the same 
companies, thus enabling us to compare the accuracy of both fore-
casts. Specifically, we could test the existence and the magnitude 
of the "forecast error multipliers" as defined by Ijiri Q.975, 
pp. 144-146} . The" results of these tests will be presented in the 
following section. As far as we know, tfrey constitute the first 
empirical evidence on this phenomenon. 
3. We asked our forecasters to express their own uncertainties by 
indicating their 50 %- and 100 %-confidence intervals. Hence, we could 
investigate the extent to which the actual outcomes and the resulting 
forecast errors came as a surprise to the participants themselves. 
4. As we established a direct contact with our respondents, we could 
ask them certain additional questions in order to get some back-
ground information which might be relevant to the explanation of 
the results. We used this opportunity particularly with the 
participating companies,sending them a follow-up questionnaire. 
This questionnaire covered (a) checks on the data we used, (b) some 
characteristics of the forecasts provided, (c) an Identification 
of the main factors causing forecast errors according to the 
corporations, and (d) possible contacts with analysts. Some of the 
follow-up information gathered in this way will be used in this paper. 
5. We included only one year of forecasts in our research. As such, the 
study already represented a rather comprehensive and time-consuming 
project. Extending this to cover additional years would have exceeded 
the means available to us and also, guite possibly, the patience of 
our respondents. 
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We have, however, tested the representativeness of 1980 for fore-
casting purposes. From these tests (which are presented in more 
detail in appendix B)f it appears that 1980 was a representative 
year for forecasting sales revenue. For profit forecasting, 1980 
seems to have been representative with respect to the direction of 
profit changes but not with respect to the volatility of profits. 
This should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. 
Error measures used 
The measures used to determine the accuracy of the management and 
analysts' forecasts are: 
the prediction error (PE) = x - x 
the absolute prediction error (APE) = |.x- £| 
the relative prediction error (RPE) = x - £ 
x 
the absolute relative prediction error (ARPE) = |x - x| 
jxj 
where:x represents the forecast of revenue or profit for 1980, and 
x represents the actual reported revenue or profit for 1980. 
As the reported revenues and earnings varied widely among the participa-
ting firms, the relative prediction errors are the most meaningful 
7) 
measures of accuracy. The PE will only be used to indicate a possible 
bias in the forecasts (the RPE is not useful for this purpose since it 
changes sign in the case of losses). The APE will only be used on a 
matched-pairs basis for comparative purposes, since the size effect 
is then eliminated. 
7) The relative prediction errors have the disadvantage of becoming 
very large as the profits (or losses) approach zero. As a consequence, 
such outliers may dominate average relative prediction errors. There-
fore, we shall present not only summary statistics on the (A)RPEs 
but also their distributions. 
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RESULTS 
Management forecasts 
Table 1 shows the RPE's determined for the management forecasts of 
revenue. The table demonstrates that these forecasts are, in the 
main, rather accurate: 55 % within the range of +_ 5 % and 79 % within 
the range of +_ 10 %. There seems to be no clear systematic bias in , 
these forecasts: 25 show a negative PE and 28 a positive PE. The 
average RPE turned out to be -0.8 % (a = 10.5) and the average ARPE 
was 7.2 % (a = 7.6). 
Table 1 about here 
A total of 52 companies indicated their 50 %-confidence intervals and 
44 their 100 %-confidence intervals. In 22 out of the 52 cases (42.3 %) 
the outcomes were within the 50 %-range, including one entirely accurate 
prediction. In 28 of the 44 cases (63.6 % ) , the actual outcome was within 
the 100 %-range. Of the eight companies that defined a 50 %-range, but 
not a 100 %-range, four produced actual sales revenues within their 
50 %-range and thus also within their 100 %-range. Figure 1 summarizes 
8) Similar data on the other error measures are omitted for the sake of 
brevity but may be obtained from the authors upon request. Forty 
management forecasts were deposited before the intemal approval date 
of the annual report; only five.forecasts were deposited more than 
a month later. For 33 of the 50 companies responding to our follow-up 
questionnaire the intemal forecasts were entirely based on budgets; 
in 10 cases they were partially based on budgets and partially on 
other forecasting techniques; in the remaining 7 cases mostly a 
"mixed system" of forecasting was used employing several methods. 
In 13 cases the forecast provided to us deviated from the intemal 
forecast, mostly to accomodate more recent information but also 
to provide a "top management interpretation" of the intemal forecast. 
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these data and shows that at least 16 of the 52 outcomes (30.8 %) came 
as a complete surprise to our participants. 
Figure 1 about here 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the RPEs associated with management's 
profit forecasts. It is clear that these RPEs are more widely distributed 
than for the revenue forecasts. Some very large prediction errors result 
from low actual profit levels (close to zero). The average RPE is -68.9 % 
(a = 507.3) and the average ARPE 160.6 (a = 485.7). Even after elimina-
tion of the six outliers identified in Table 2, the average ARPE was 
50.4 %. Only 9 % of the companies have a RPE between +_ 5 % and only 
27 % a RPE between +_ 10 %. Nearly two-thirds (64.2 %) of the prediction 
errors were negative, indicating an optimistic bias of management in 
9) 
forecasting profits. 
Table 2 about here 
For most managers the actual profits came as a complete surprise. 
Figure 2 illustrates that for at least 28 (52.8 %) of our 53 companies 
the actual results feil outside their 100 %-confidence interval. For 
21 of these companies the results were (much) lower than they expected 
and for seven companies the results were (much) higher. 
9) Significant differences exist between the forecast errors per 
industry. The profit forecasts of insurance companies, printing 
and publishing firms as well as banks were relatively most accurate. 
In a multiple regression, the industry dummies proved significant, 
but no significant relationship could be established between the 
forecast errors and (a) the size of the companies or (b) the time 
of deposit of the forecast. These analyses are available from the 
authors upon request. 
- 13 -
Figure 2 about here 
Finally, we may compare the prediction errors associated with the 
management forecasts of revenue and profit. This examination is 
particularly relevant with respect to Ijiri's p.975, pp. 144-146] 
"forecast error multiplier". In Ijiri's analysis the forecast error 
multiplier is defined as the ratio between the profit forecast error « ' 
and the sales volume (or, with constant prices, sales revenue) fore-
cast error. He shows that the magnitude of the forecast error multiplier 
is dependent upon the proportion of fixed costs in the total cost 
structure: the higher the proportion of fixed costs, the higher the 
forecast error multiplier. What empirical evidence can we present on this 
matter? One test of Ijiri's assumptions is to determine whether the 
profit and revenue prediction errors have the same sign. If the former 
are only an amplification of the latter, this should be the case. 
Table 3 shows a classification of the prediction errors according to 
sign. Twenty of our 53 observations do not conform to the expectation 
of equivalent signs. Apparently, in these cases it is necessary to take 
more (or other) factors into account to explain the profit forecast 
error. It is accordingly meaningless to compute forecast error 
multipliers in these cases. We have, therefore, computed the ratio 
of the profit to the revenue ARPE instead. This measure by definition 
ignores the sign of the prediction 'error. Excluding outliers, the 
50 4 
value of the ratio is _' = 7.0. In all industries, the profit 
forecast errors were larger than the revenue forecast errors. 
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Table 3 about here 
Analysts' forecasts 
Of the analysts invited to participate, more than thirty accepted the 
invitation. Since some large departments of banks which cooperated 
sent all their forecasts under one name, we do not know the exact 
number of participating analysts. The analysts produced 119 revenue 
forecasts and 124 profit forecasts, most, but not all, of which related 
to the participating companies. Table 4 shows the distribution of the 
RPEs of the analysts' revenue forecasts. 
Table 4 about here 
The average RPE is 4.2 % (o = 10.0) , while the average ARPE is 7.9 % 
(er = 7.4). Most of the analysts' forecasts (73.1 %) showed a positive 
prediction error, indicating that the analysts were in general too 
pessimistic about the corporate revenues. Nearly forty percent of the 
actual revenues were outside the analysts' 100 %-confidence intervals, 
which means that 40 % of the outcomes were not at all expected by the 
analysts. By far, the majority of these outcomes were higher than expected, 
Table 5 about here 
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All 124 analysts' forecasts contained a profit forecast. Contrary to 
the revenue forecasts, the profit forecasts were mainly too optimistic, 
as 57.3 % of the prediction errors were negative. Table 5 shows the 
distribution of the analysts' profit forecast errors, as measured by 
the RPE. The RPEst of profit forecasts are clearly more widely 
distributed than those of revenue forecasts. The average RPE is -71.8 % 
with a very high Standard deviation of 723.8. The average ARPE is 138.5 % 
with a Standard deviation of 713.9. If we delete the eight outliers, 
identified in Table 5, the ARPE is 40.6 (a = 45.5). The analysts were 
also in many cases surprised by the magnitude of the actual profit 
figures. In 70 out of 117 cases (59.8 %) the actual profit was outside 
the 100 %-confidence interval as defined by the analysts. Nearly two-
thirds of these cases inyolved unexpectedly low profits. In 43 out of 
119 cases a positive revenue prediction error was associated with a 
negative profit prediction error. Added to the eight cases in which the 
reverse was true, the analysts produced prediction errors with contrary 
signs in 43 % of the cases. For analysts, too, the predictability of 
revenues was much bettef than the predictability of profits. If we 
delete the eight outliers, indicated in Table 5, the ratio of the 
profit ARPE to the revenue ARPE turns out to be •_•* = 5.1. 
/. y 
We tested the relationships between the analysts' RPEs and (1) the 
type of industry, (21 the type of analyst, (3) the time of deposit of 
the forecast, (4). the company size, and (5) the information available 
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to the analyst. On a univariate basis, the first and the last factor 
produced significant differences in RPEg,. On a multivariate basis (i.e. 
a multiple regression), however, only the industry variables showed a 
significant relationship with the analyst RPEs.. Therefore, inter-
action effects are probably responsible for the univariate results with 
respect to the information available to analysts. 
A comparison of management and analysts' forecasts 
The results reported above were based on management forecasts for 53 
companies and on 124 analysts* forecasts for these, but also for some 
other, companies. For comparative purposes we have reduced our sample 
to those companies for which there is a management forecast and at 
least one analyst forecast available. If more than one analysts' 
forecast was available, the average was computed. Our sample now 
contains 34 companies for revenue forecasts and 38 companies for profit 
forecasts. Included are 98 revenue forecasts and 113 profit forecasts 
of analysts. The number of analysts' forecasts per company ranges from 
one to seven. Table 6 gives some first insights into the comparative 
accuracy of these forecasts. 
Table 6 about here 
10) All analysts were asked to file their forecasts with the notary 
before the date of publication of the 1979 annual report of the 
company to be forecasted. This was done to ensure that the timing 
of the management and analysts '• forecasts would be about the same. 
This procedure could, however, introducé a handicap for the analysts 
in that they might have no knowledge of the financial outcomes of the 
previous year. Therefore, the analysts were asked to indicate, 
along with their forecast, whether or not, at the time of making 
their forecast for 1980, they had reliable information concerning 
the revenue and profit for 1979. We obtained 84 positive replies and 
40 negative replies. On a univariate basis the available information 
had no marked effect on the accuracy of revenue forecasts but seemed 
to affect the accuracy of profit forecasts significantly. The average 
ARPE of the 84 forecasts based on reliable 1979 information was 35.7 % 
while the other 40 profit forecasts produced an average ARPE of 354.3 '• 
All eight outliers, indicated in Table 5, feil into the latter group. 
See, however, the main text for the multivariate outcomes. Details of 
these analyses may be obtained from the authors. 
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Analyzing the comparative revenue data first, we observe that all 
prediction errors are smaller for management than for the analysts, 
although the differences are not very impressive for the two absolute 
measures. In all cases the Standard deviations are quite large, 
indicating a wide dispersion of the observations. The other characteris-
tics are very similar: both management and the analysts were too 
pessimistic about the sales revenues and to very much the same extent. 
Both also defined the confidence intervals far too narrowly. 
Turning our attention to the comparative profit data, we observe very 
small differences between the PEs and APEs of management and the 
analysts. The relative prediction errors show somewhat larger differences, 
but these measures are very heavily influenced by outliers when applied 
to our profit data. Eliminating four of these for both sets of data, 
the RPE for management becomes -2.4 % and for analysts -3.6 %, while 
the ARPEs are 45.1 % and 51.1 %, respectively. Management was a bit 
more optimistic than the analysts in the case of the profit forecasts. 
Both groups very much underestimated the uncertainty associated with 
their profit forecasts and were completely surprised by the actual 
outcomes in about sixty percent of the cases. 
In order to test for significance of these differences, we have applied 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed*-ranks test to the data in Table 7. 
Table 7 reveals that management out-performed the analysts in 19 out of 
34 cases when the absolute prediction error is taken as the measure of 
the accuracy of their revenue forecasts. In two cases it was a draw, 
while the analysts out-performed management in 13 cases. This difference 
111 See Brown and Rozeff Ll978{ f o r a critique of some other tests used ir 
previous research and for an exposition of the applicability of the 
Wilcoxon test. 
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is not significant at the normal significance levels of 5 % or 10 %; 
the Wilcoxon test shows a significance level of 15 %. For the profit 
forecasts the differences are even smaller. Management out-performed 
the analysts in only 20 out of 38 cases. Needless to say, this 
12) difference is far from significant (Wilcoxon test: 22 % ) . 
Table 7 about here 
Finally, we have tested the extent to which these comparative results may 
have been influenced by prior contacts between the analysts and the 
companies. In our follow-up questionnaire to the companies we asked 
whether they generally provided forward-looking information to analysts 
either by supplying their internal estimates or by providing other 
information useful for making estimates or by indicating whether they 
regarded the forecasts prepared by analysts as "reasonable". Fifteen 
of the 38 companies in our comparative sample answered affirmatively. 
These fifteen companies were subsequently asked whether they had provided 
such forward-looking information on 1980 to analysts in the months 
before depositing their forecast. Five firms replied that this had not 
been the case. For the other ten firms, therefore, a vossi.b-iZi.ty existed 
that the analysts* forecasts were not independent from management fore-
13) 
casts. Is our finding that no significant differences exist between 
12) It may be added that these comp'arisons have been made on the 
basis of all available analysts' forecasts, whether the analyst 
had indicated that he had reliable information on 1979 or not. 
As shown above, the availability of such information may have 
had some effect on the accuracy of analysts' profit forecasts. 
If the uninformed analysts are eliminated, however, management 
still shows a slightly greater accuracy than the analysts, and 
the difference is still not significant. 
13) As it was not feasible to ask the firms for details of each and 
every contact with analysts in those months, we could only identify 
the possibility of contacts with analysts in our sample. 
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the management and analysts' forecasting accuracy to be explained by 
the analysts' knowledge of forward-looking information provided to 
them by these ten firms? Do these ten firms constitute a major portion 
of the 18 instances in which the analysts out-performed management in 
forecasting profits? This does not appear to be the case. For only 
three of the ten firms did the analysts produce a more accurate profit 
forecast than the company itself. Hence, if we were to eliminate these 
ten firms from our sample, the comparative results would shift to 
favor the analysts. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study can only to a limited extent be compared 
with prëvious research. As we are aware of no other study designed to 
investigate the comparative accuracy of confidential internal forecasts 
of revenue and profit by corporate managements and analysts, we 
feel that the results reported here may best be regarded by themselves, 
i.e. as the first indications of the (comparative) guality of internal 
management and analysts' forecasts of revenue and profit. In our 
opinion, the most striking outcome is the inaccuracy of these fore-
casts as measured by the d pr%OPV expectations of the forecasters 
themselves. Thirty percent of the actual sales revenues and more than 
half of the actual profits feil outside the 100 %-confidence intervals 
of management. For the entire analysts' sample these figures were 
nearly forty percent and sixty percent, respectively. These outcomes 
raise serious guestions with respect to the corporate and analysts' 
forecasting systems and/or their ability to assess the uncertainties 
involved in preparing financial forecasts. 
One may, however, wish to compare our results concerning internal profit 
forecasts with those obtained previously with respect to published 
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profit forecasts. Two main points emerge from such a comparison. One 
is that the forecast errors reported in this study are larger than 
those generally found in previous research. The second point is that 
management was found to forecast profits slightly, but not significantly, 
more accurately than analysts. This outcome is well in line with the 
general findings of previous comparative research as discussed in 
Section 1. Both points will be commented upon below. 
Which factors might explain the differences between the forecast errors 
established here and those reported in earlier research? Obvious factors 
include (1) the differences between the Dutch samples used here and the 
US and UK samples used earlier, (2) the consequences of using internal 
rather than published forecasts as discussed in Section 2 as well as 
(3) the different time periods involved. Profit levels were xjenerally 
lower in the Netherlands in 1980 than in the US in the early 1970s, the 
years on which the results of Basi et al. £l976[ , Imhoff Q.978J , Ruland 
[JL978] and Jaggi [J-98ÖJ are* based. This factor tends to inflate the relative 
prediction errors of profit, especially as the profit levels approach 
14) 
zero, as was the case for some of our observations. Nevertheless, 
another factor may be operative as well. Imhoff Q978J and Jaggi and 
Grier fl98ÖJ have demonstrated that firms which voluntarily disclose 
their profit forecasts exhibit more stable earnings properties than non-
disclosing firms. Therefore, these firms may be expected to forecast 
their profits relatively accurately and may be non-representative of all 
firms in this respect. In this study, similar tests indicate that we 
14) In addition, it should be borne in mind that the volatility of 
profits was higher in 1980 than expected on the basis of previous 
years (see appendix B). Furthermore, different definitions of RPE 
may blur the comparison with other research. We used RPEs with 
actual profits in the denominator. In some other studies, forecasted 
profits appear in the denominator. If there is an optimistic bias 
in profit forecasts, as was the case here and in most US research, 
our definition leads to higher RPEs. 
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have obtained a representative sample of all firms listed on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Thus, the self-selection bias implicit in 
using published forecasts has been avoided here. To the extent that 
the attributes examined in the representativeness tests indeed affect 
the forecast errors, we have probably arrived at a truer picture of 
the forecasting accuracy for all firms in the popuiation. 
The second and last point we would like to comment upon is the congruenca ' 
between our comparative results for the management and analysts' fore-
casts and the corresponding results achieved in previous research. Most 
of the research in this area has been motivated by the desire to contribute 
to the debate on publication of corporate forecasts. The relative accuracy 
of these forecasts was regarded as a precondition for the usefulness of 
such data. We would like to add that corporate forecasts may also be useful 
if they reflect the uncertainty involved in the prediction of the firm's 
outcomes more accurately. However, in neither respect did management show 
a significantly better performance than the analysts in this study. Our 
results are based on internal rather than published forecasts. As such, 
they present evidence of another kind on the relative forecasting accuracy 
of management and analysts. What do these results contribute to the debate 
on publication of corporate forecasts? 
It should be made clear at the outset that we regard the issue of forecast 
disclosure as a matter of accounting policy which cannot ultimately be 
resolved by empirical research. All kinds of costs, benefits, and preferences 
play a role, and these cannot be totally captured (or reconciled) within a 
research framework. Nevertheless, if forecast information is to meet certain 
standards of accuracy for it to be useful, research may aim at examining 
the (expected) accuracy of these data and thus contribute to the 
assessment of the possible benefits of voluntary or mandatory disclosure 
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of corporate forecasts. Viewed in this context, research results on the 
comparative accuracy of corporate forecasts thus bear upon the potential 
benefits of forecast disclosure. If the empirical evidence which is 
gradually being gathered on the basis of different samples, time periods 
and research designs in general continues to point in the direction 
described above, the benefits of forecast disclosure appear to be 
significantly smaller than has generally been assumed. 
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Appendix A 
In order to test whether our 53 participating firms were representative 
of all firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange/ we have conducted 
two types of tests, both on the revenue and the profit data,and using 
two different forecasting models to generate the test data. The two 
types of tests were suggested by previous research of Imhoff p.978] 
and Jaggi and Grier L198Ö] • We refer to these articles for a discussion 
of these tests and deal here only with our test procedures. 
We have first applied nine different forecasting models to the 1974-1979 
15) 
revenue and profit data of our 53 firms. From an evaluation of the 
resulting prediction errors it turned out that for purposes of fore-
casting revenue the following models performed best: 
I. The random walk plus constant: Y. . ,, = Y . ,_ + a 
D/t+1 3,t 
(the constant representing the average historical growth) 
/> 
II. The model of identical change: Y. = Y . + (Y. . - Y. ,) 
D,t+l D »t 3,t 3,t—1 
For profit forecasting purposes the best performance resulted from: 
/\ 
III. The random walk model: Y. ^ . = Y. ^  
3,t+l ],t 
while model I showed good results,too, as well as an exponentially 
weighted moving average. 
Subsequently, these models were used in the following two types of tests: 
A) A test on the variability of historical revenue and profit. Models 
I and II were fitted to the 1974-1979 revenue data and models I and 
III to the profit data. On the basis of the residuals we estimated 
the Standard deviation of the prediction error. This Standard 
deviation was used as a measure of the variability. 
15) Models not discussed below included a linear and a multij-licative 
trend model, a random walk multiplied by average percentage growth, 
a model of identical percentage change, an exponentially wgighted 
moving average and the Elton and Gruber [_1972j model of an 
exponentially weighted moving average with no trend in trend. 
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B) A test on the forecast errors (i.e. the ARPEs) resulting from the 
application of both revenue and profit forecasting models to generate 
predictions for 1980. 
From the total population of 182 firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange by the end of 1981 we eliminated 45 firms for various reasons. 
Among these reasons were that these firms (a) were (real estate) 
investment funds, (b) exhibited major structural changes, (c) had been ' 
in existence for too short a period, and (d) published insufficiënt or 
inadequate Information (such as only a revenue index). Thus, we could 
test the representativeness of our 53 firms against 84 other firms. 
We employed the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum test to determine the 
differences in variability and forecasting errors between these two 
samples. The test results are shown in Table 8. The absolute value of 
the test result should be greater than 1.960 to indicate a significance 
level of 5 %. None of the tests passes this criterion. Only the 
application of model I to the revenue data yields a significance level 
of 10 % for the differences in forecasting errors. None of the other 
tests shows such a significance level. On the contrary, the differences 
in variability which were significant in the research of Imhoff [1978J 
and Jaggi and Grier £l98Óf are very small in our research, as are the 
differences in profit prediction errors. Only with the revenue prediction 
errors does there remain some doubt, as one test points to a significance 
level of about 7 % and the other yields no significant result. All in 
all, however, we would conclude from the eight tests together that our 
sample may be regarded as representative of all firms on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. 
Table 8 about here 
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Appendix B 
Another set of tests was conducted to determine whether 1980 could be 
regarded as a representative year for forecasting purposes. Again we 
applied the forecasting models indicated in Appendix A to the 
1974-1979 revenue and profit data of the firms forecasted by management 
and/or the analysts. Our first test was whether the revenue and profit 
predictions for 1980 showed a significant optimistic or pessimistic
 t • 
bias. By application of the normal approximation of the binomial 
distribution (assuming an equal chance of over- and underestimation) 
we calculated the ranges outside of which the percentages of under-
and overpredictions should fall to be significant at the 10 %- or 
5 %-level. These ranges are shown in Table 9 together with the actual 
percentages of the models selected. It turns out that none of the 
distributions of over- and underpredictions falls outside the 
10 %-significance range (although model I for profit comes close). 
Therefore it can be concluded that the direction of revenue and profit 
changes in 1980 does not significantly differ from what would be 
expected on the basis of historical data. 
Table 9 about here 
Our second.test involved intervals similar to those we asked from^our 
management and analysts' participants. For the models, too, we calculated 
a 50 %-interval indicating the area in which the model predicts the 
outcome to be with 50 % certainty. Instead of a 100 %-interval, which 
is not empirically testable for forecasting models, we chose a 95 %-
interval. Table 10 shows the percentages of actual outcomes falling 
into both intervals. The percentages of revenue outcomes within the 
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TabIe 10 about here 
50%-interval conform rather well to the specified levels, but, for 
the profit outcomes, this is clearly not the case. One of both 
percentages of revenue outcomes within the 95%-interval is statis-
tically significant at the 5%-level, while both profit percentages 
are. Overall, this leads us to conclude that the volatility of profits 
was higher in 1980 than could be expected on the basis of historical 
data. 
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Table 1 Dlstribution of relative prediction errors of management forecasts 
of revenue 
RPE n % of total cumulative % 
(30 %) - (20 %} 3 6 6 
(20 %) - (15 %) 4 7 13 
(15 %) - (10 %) - - 13 
(10 %1 - ( 5 %1 6 11 24 
( 5 %ï - 0 % 12 23 47 
0 % - 5 % 17 32 79 
5 % - 10 % 7 13 92 
10 % - 15 % 2 4 96 
15 % - 20 % - - 96 
20 % - 30 % 1 £
 9 8 
30 % - 4Q % 1 2 100 
53 100 
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Table 2. Distribution of relative predlction errors of management 
forecasts of profit 
RPE 
%>bi 
n 
4 
% of total 
8 
cumulative % 
< (200 8 
(200 %) - (150 %) 
- •^  8 
(150 %) - (100 %) 3 6 13 
(100 %). - (50 %) 4 8 21 
(50 %) - (40 %) 1 2 23 
(40 %) - (30 %1 4 8 30 
(30 %) - (20 %). 2 4 34 
(20 %} - (15 %). 2 4 38 
(15 %) - (10 %) 1 2 40 
(10 %) - ( 5 %1 5 9 49 
( 5 %) - 0 % - -^ 49 
0 % 5 % 5 9 58 
5 % 10 % 5" 9 68 
10 % - 15 % r^ - 68 
15 % - 2Q % 1 2 70 
20 % - 30 % 2 4 74 
30 % - 40 % 3 6 79 
4Q % - 50 % ^ 
~ 
79 
50 % - 10Q % 1 2 81 
100 % - 150 % 4 8 89 
150 % - 200 % 4 8 96 
> 2QQ % c I 2 
53 
4 
1QQ 
100 
a). Due to rounding errors these percentages do nat add up to exactly 100 %. 
bï These negative outliers were: -^231 %, ^460 %, T.970 % and *-339ê %. 
c). These positive outliers were: 370 % and 715 %, 
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Table 3. A classification of the revenue and profit prediction errors 
according to sign 
Profit prediction error 
positive negative total 
Revenue predic- positive 13 14 27 
tion error 
20a) negative 6 26 
total 19 34 53 
a) Including one entirely accurate revenue forecast. 
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Tafcle 4 Distri&ution of relatiye prediction errors of analysts' forecasts 
of revenua 
RPE 
(40 %I - (30 %I 1 
(30 %L - (20 %1 
(20 %I - (15 %1 2 
(15 %1 - (10 %1 5 
(10 %1 - ( 5 %I 7 
( 5 %1 - Q % 17 
0 % - 5 % 33 
5 % - 10 % 32 
10 % - 15 % 12 
15 % - 20 % 4 
2Q % - 30 % 5 
3Q % - 40 % 
40 % ^ 50 % r> 
5Q % - 60 % 1 
% of total cumulative % 
1 1 
- 1 
2 3 
4 7 
6 13 
14 27 
28 55 
27 82 
IQ 92 
3 95 
4 99 
T* 99 
- 99 
1 100 
119 1QQ % 
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Table 5 Distribution of relative prediction errors of analysts' forecasts 
of profit  
RPE 
%) 
n 
4 b ) 
% of total 
3 
cumulc 
< (200 3 
(200 %) - (150 %) 4 3 6 
(150 %) - (100 %) 3 2 9 
(100 %) - ( 50 %) 9 7 16 
( 50 %) - ( 40 %) 6 5 21 
( 40 %) - ( 30 %) 8 6 27 
( 30 %) - ( 20 %) 4 3 31 
( 20 %) - ( 15 %) - - 31 
( 15%) .- ( 10 %) 2 2 32 
( 10 %) - ( 5 %) 9 7 40 
( 5 %) - 0 % 9 7 47 
0 % 5 % 15 12 59 
5 % 10 % 6 5 64 
10 % 15 % 9 - 7 71 
15 % - 20 % 1 1 72 
20 % - 30 % 8 6 78 
30 % - 40 % 6 5 83 
40 % - 50 % - - 83 
50 % - 100 % 6 5 88 
100 % - 150 % 9 7 95 
150 % - 200 % 2 2 97 
> 200 % 4C1 
124 
3 
100 % 
100 
a) Due to rounding errors these percentages do not add up to exactly 100 %. 
b) These negative outliers were: -271 %, -876 %, -1766 % and -7721 %. 
c) These positive outliers were: 282 %, 327 %, 356 % and 869 %. 
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Table 6 Some characteristics of management and analysts' revenue and 
profit forecasts  
Revenue Profit 
Measure 
PE 
PE 
APE 
aAPE 
RPE 
a RPE 
ARPE 
a ARPE 
Management Analysts 
25.5 94.0 
197.3 203.3 
81.4 109.3 
181.0 195.2 
0.8 ' 1.8 
10.5 10.2 
6.7 7.7 
8.0 6.8 
Management Analysts 
-13.5 -12.2 
52.4 50.6 
16.8 17.9 
51.4 48.8 
-27.0 -48.6 
223.0 346.4 
102.9 139.4 
199.0 320.1 
Other aspects 
% of everestimates 41.2 
% of underestimates 58.8 
% in 50 %-range 44.1 
% in 100 %-range 65.5 
38. ,2 
61. .8 
44. .1 
64, .7 
65.8 57.9 
34.2 42.1 
29.7 26.3 
40.6 36.8 
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Table 7 Comparison of performance of management vis-a-vis the analysts 
Revenue Profit 
APE < APE , 19 20 
man anal 
APE = APE .. 2 
man anal 
APE > APE , - 1 3 18 
man anal 
34 38 
Wilcoxon test - 1.028 0.776 
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Table 8. Tests of the representativeness of the participating firms 
Revenue Profit 
Model I Model II Model I Model III 
Variability 0.212 0.102 -0.340 0.000 
AKPE -1.834* -1.397 0.115 0.013 
* significant at IQ %/^ level, 
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Table 9. Percentages of over*- and underprêdictions resulting from the application 
of the selected forecasting models 
REVENUE PROFIT 
Significance 
level 
Range Model I Model II 
over under over under 
Range Model I Model III 
over under over under 
10 % 40.0-60.0 39.6-60.4 
43.3 56.7 55.2 44.8 60.3 39.7 55.6 44.4 
5 % 38.0-62.0 • 37.7-62.3 
n = 67 n = 63 
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Table 10. Percentage of realizations within the 50 %- and 95 %-intervals resulting 
from the application of selected foreca'sting models 
KEVENUE PROFIT 
Confidence-
interval 
Model I Model II Model I Model III 
50 % 
95 % 
47.8 % 
85.1 %** 
53.7 % 
91.0 % 
31.7 %** 
74.6 %** 
34.9 %** 
81.0 %** 
** significant at 5 %-level. 
- 39 -
Figure '1 The actual sales revenues in relation to the confidence intervals 
of management  
4 9 ' 1 12 6 
— I 1 1 1 h-
-100% -50% -* 50 % 100% 
x 
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Pigure 2 The actual profits in relation to tiae confidence intervals of 
management ^ , 
21 6 3 10 1 7 
<: 1 1 +- 1 1 > 
^ÏQQ % ^5Q % x 50 % 100 % 
